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V. REMOVAL AND REMAND
A. Introduction
Once a plaintiff files a claim in state court, defendants often try
to remove the case to federal court. The presumption is that federal
courts are more defendant-friendly.' This presumption was recently
substantiated by a law review article by Kevin M. Clermont and
Theodore Eisenberg,2 which provided statistical data that revealed
defendants who successfully remove to federal court enjoy higher
win rates. Because of this, the respective interests of plaintiffs and
defendants make the battle over a state or federal forum especially
fierce.
The statutes that govern removal and remand complicate this
battle. The statutes themselves can be complex, conflicting, and are
occasionally trumped by other congressional legislation. In addition,
how the courts interpret the statutes can differ, producing very
different results from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Because of this,
even a plaintiff that originally files her case in state court may
strategically choose a state court sitting in a federal district that
interprets the rules more favorably to her interests, if there
is a chance the case could be removed. Furthermore, removal and
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1. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 55 (2d ed. 1993).
2. See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case
Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and
Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581 (1998) (discussing the very
low percentage of plaintiff win rates in removed cases, as opposed to a
significantly higher percentage of plaintiff wins in cases adjudicated in state
courts or those originally brought in federal courts).
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remand are riddled with constitutional issues, forcing courts to
proceed with the greatest caution.
B. Removal under § 1441(a)
Under § 1441 of the United States Code,3 a defendant can
generally remove a civil case brought in state court to federal court if
that case could have originally been brought in federal court.4 To
properly bring a case in federal court, a case must fall into one of the
categories set forth in Article III section 2 of the U.S. Constitution.5
Of the types of cases over which federal courts have jurisdiction, §
14416 only authorizes removal of diversity cases (those between
completely diverse parties where the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000), 7 and cases that present a federal question. 8 Because of the
potential for federalism issues, courts generally construe the statutes
strictly against removal.9  Though Congress has amended the
removal statute several times l ° with the "inten[t] to resolve
ambiguities and conflicts of decisions," 11 courts continue to struggle
to determine whether removal is proper in some cases. Furthermore,
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000).
4. Id.
5. The Constitution extends federal judicial power to:
all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws
of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority; - to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;.- to all Cases of admiralty and maritime.
Jurisdiction; - to Controversies to which the United States shall be a
Party; - to Controversies between two or more States; - between a
State and Citizens of another State; - between Citizens of different
States; - between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under the
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof,
and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art III, § 2
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
7. Id. at § 1332.
8. Id. at § 1331.
9. See Russell Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 264 F.3d 1040, 1049
(11 th Cir. 2001); Guas v. Miles Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992).
10. See generally 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441 (2000 & Supp. 2003) (outlining
history of revision of the statute).
11. Id., historical and revision notes.
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federal courts must also comply with any new congressional
legislation that may limit or expand the general removal
requirements.'
2
1. New legislation affecting removal
While Congress's stated intent is to restrict the number of
diversity cases that get into federal courts, 13 removal legislation has
had the opposite effect by allowing cases to be removed that would
not have been removable under § 1441.4 For example, Congress
passed the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
(SLUSA),' 5 which requires class actions dealing with certain
"covered securities" to be removed to federal court. 6 In addition,
the Multiparty, Multiform Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002 (MMTJA)
abrogated the complete diversity requirement for mass disaster class
action suits.17 The MMTJA confers federal jurisdiction over cases
where only minimal diversity exists, requiring only that any plaintiff
be diverse from any defendant 8 (as opposed to the complete
diversity requirement of § 1332, that all plaintiffs must be diverse
from all defendants). 19
12. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (allowing removal "[e]xcept as otherwise
expressly provided by Act of Congress ").
13. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 85-1830 (1958).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2000).
16. For the history and legislative intent of the SLUSA, see Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Publ.L.No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227; H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 105-803 (1998). Basically, Congress was trying to
close a loophole created by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 (PSLRA). The PSLRA was passed to prevent abuse of class action
"strike suits" against securities defendants, where the defendants were forced
to settle to avoid costly discovery. The PSLRA allowed defendants to obtain
early dismissal of these frivolous suits. The effect of the PSLRA was an
increase in such strike suits being brought in state courts. In essence, the
SLUSA preempts the state actions by requiring removal of cases to federal
court, where defendants could obtain early dismissal. See also Spielman v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 332 F.3d 116, 122-23 (2d Cir.
2003) (discussing history of securities legislation).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (2002).
18. Id. In addition to minimal diversity, the Act also requires inter alia, that
the action must arise from a single accident, where at least seventy-five natural
persons have died at a discrete location. Id. The requirements of the Act seem
to limit its application to airline or other mass transit disasters. See id.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
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While both acts deal with relatively narrow areas of jurisdiction
(class actions involving covered securities and mass disasters such as
plane crashes), they provide some indication that the proposed Class
Action Fairness Act may have enough congressional support to pass.
The proposed Class Action Fairness Act "would allow for federal
jurisdiction over virtually all nationwide or multi-state class
actions."
20
Not only does the removal legislation raise federalism concerns
at a constitutional level,21 but it also necessitates new litigation
strategies for plaintiffs and defendants. Defendants may cheer for
the expansion of federal jurisdiction (assuming that federal courts are
more defendant-friendly).22 On the other hand, the battle over
removal can tie a case up for years,23 and delay can sometimes
be a defendant's strongest ally-if the Act grants original federal
jurisdiction, delay would be minimal. From the plaintiffs
perspective, federal courts may be less generous than the more
liberal state courts. On the flip side, the Act could result in injured
parties getting a more even share of the judgment "pie" by lumping
all potential plaintiffs into the same action where there will be no
possibility for inconsistent rulings or disparate damages awards.
This debate illustrates the substantial role forum selection plays in
the success or failure of a case.24
20. Georgene M. Vairo, An Important Act with Two Antecedents More
Controversial than the Original, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 16, 2002, at B7.
21. For a discussion of the MMTJA as an indicator of further class action
legislation and the potential impact on federalism issues, see Georgene M.
Vairo, Problems in Federal Forum Selection and Concurrent Federal State
Jurisdiction: Supplemental Jurisdiction; Diversity Jurisdiction; Removal;
Preemption; Venue; Transfer of Venue; Personal Jurisdiction; Abstention and
The All Writs Act, in 1 ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS: CIVIL
PRACTICE AND LITIGATION TECHNIQUES IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 221
(January 2003), WL SH063 ALI-ABA 221.
22. See FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 1, at 55.
23. See Hendricks v. Dynegy Power Mktg. Inc., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (S.D.
Cal. 2001). This case has been removed and remanded twice and is now
awaiting appeal in the Ninth Circuit. The initial case was filed almost three
years ago and it has not yet been determined which court should hear the case.
24. See generally Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 2 (discussing the very
low percentage of plaintiff win rates in removed cases, as opposed to a
significantly higher percentage of plaintiff wins in cases adjudicated in state
courts or those originally brought in federal courts).
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2. Federal question issues
a. artful pleading
2 s
In order for a plaintiff's case to be removed under federal
question jurisdiction,26 the plaintiff's complaint must affirmatively
27allege a federal claim. Despite this, a plaintiff may not avoid
federal jurisdiction by cloaking a truly federal law claim as a state
law claim, a practice referred to as "artful pleading., 28 To determine
whether or not a federal claim is at the heart of the plaintiffs
state law claim, a court will "'delve beyond the face of the state
court complaint and find federal question jurisdiction' by
'recharacteriz[ing] a plaintiffs state-law claim as a federal claim.' 29
Due in large part to federalism concerns, the mere presence of a
federal issue in a state law claim, though, is not enough to confer
federal jurisdiction.30 Instead, the claim must be either necessarily
federal in nature31 or the right to relief itself must depend on the
"resolution of a substantial, disputed federal question.' 32  Once a
court determines that a federal question is an essential part of the
plaintiffs claim, the plaintiff cannot avoid removal with artful
pleading. Instead, the court looks at the case as one that originally
could have been filed in federal court, and the defendant will have
the opportunity to remove.
b. well-pleaded complaint
33
Under the related well-pleaded complaint rule, removal of cases
is precluded where the plaintiffs cause of action is created by state
25. For a more detailed discussion on the issue of artful pleading, see supra
Part III.C.4.
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
27. Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 123 S. Ct. 2058, 2059 (2003).
28. Burda v. M. Ecker Co., 954 F.2d 434,438 (7th Cir. 1992).
29. Lippitt v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 340 F.3d 1033, 1041 (9th
Cir. 2003) (quoting Precision Pay Phones v. Quest Communications Corp., 210
F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1112-13 (N.D. Cal. 2002)); Hunter v. United Van Lines,
746 F.2d 635, 640 (9th Cir. 1985).
30. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986).
31. Lippitt, 340 F.3d at 1041-42 (citing Brennan v. Southwest Airlines Co.,
134 F.3d 1405, 1409 (9th Cir. 1998)).
32. Id. at 1042 (citing Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814).
33. For a more detailed discussion on the issue of the well-pleaded
complaint rule, see supra Part III.C.3.
Summer 20041 1559
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1555
law, but an aspect of federal law is an important element of the
defendant's defense.34 The rule severely limits the number of cases
in which state law creates the cause of action that may be originated
in or removed to federal court.35 Like the artful pleading doctrine,
the well-pleaded complaint rule requires the court to determine
whether a federal question is an essential part of the plaintiffs
complaint.36 For jurisdiction to be proper, the plaintiff's claim must
allege an issue substantially arising under federal law completely
"'unaided by anything alleged in anticipation of avoidance of
defenses which it is thought the defendant might interpose."'
37
Therefore, a defendant cannot remove where the federal question is
only part of her defense. Rather, the federal question must appear on
the face of the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint.
c. preemption38
As a general rule, absent diversity jurisdiction, a case is not
removable unless the plaintiff affirmatively alleges a federal claim in
her complaint. 39 "Potential defenses, including a federal statute's
preemptive effect, do not provide a basis for removal[,]" although an
"exception to the general rule occurs when a federal statute
completely preempts a cause of action. 40 While issues of federal
law can completely preempt a plaintiffs complaint, the application
of this doctrine has been relatively narrow, as courts have held that
complete preemption occurs only in extraordinary circumstances.41
The Supreme Court- has identified only three federal statutes that
34. Lippitt, 340 F.3d at 1039-40 (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Const.
Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1983)).
35. Id. at 1039-40 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 9-10).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1040 (quoting Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75-76 (1914)).
38. For a more detailed discussion on the issue of preemption, see supra
Part III.D.
39. Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 123 S. Ct. 2058, 2059 (2003) (citing
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Const. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983)); see
also supra Part V.B.2.b.
40. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 123 S. Ct. at 2059.
41. Ansley v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 340 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 2003)




meet the "extraordinary circumstances" requirement:42 (1) Section
301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act;4 3 (2) Section 502 of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974; 44 and (3) the
usury provisions of the National Bank Act.45 Courts have held that
other acts, such as the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act
46
and the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,47 do not completely
preempt state law.48 Given that the Supreme Court so recently
addressed the issue of complete preemption in Beneficial National
Bank49 and identified only three statutes that qualify, coupled with
the federalism issues inherent in the preemption doctrine, it is
unlikely that federal courts will expand the scope of "extraordinary
circumstances" under which state law is completely preempted by
federal law anytime soon.
3. Removal based on diversity-fraudulent joinder
a. the usual suspects and standards ofproof
Fraudulent joinder is a hotly litigated issue in removal
jurisdiction. Defendants increasingly allege that plaintiffs have
fraudulently-joined defendants in efforts to defeat federal jurisdiction
by destroying complete diversity. 50  For example, in a products
liability case against a diverse pharmaceutical manufacturer, the
plaintiff may add non-diverse doctors or pharmacists as defendants,
wrecking complete diversity.5 1  Other examples of the usual
"fraudulently-joined" suspects include retailers,
52 wholesalers, 53
42. Id. at 862 (compiling list as articulated in Beneficial Nat'l. Bank, 123 S.
Ct. at 2062-64).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2000).
44. Id. at§ 1132.
45. 12 U.S.C. §§ 85, 86 (2000).
46. Id. at § 3801.
47. 49 U.S.C. § 41713 (2000).
48. Ansley, 340 F.3d at 864; Wayne, 294 F.3d at 1184.
49. 123 S. Ct. 2058 (2003).
50. Alan E. Rothman et al., Advances in Protecting Defendants' Right to
Remove from State to Federal Court, 20 LJN's PRODUCT LIABILITY L. &
STRATEGY, May 2002, at 1, WL 20 No. 11 LJNPLLST 1.
51. See Collins v. Am. Home Prods., 343 F.3d 765 (5th Cir. 2003).
52. See Tillman v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 340 F.3d 1277 (1 Ith Cir. 2003);
Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Holmes County, 343 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2003); In re
Benjamin Moore & Co., 318 F.3d 626 (5th Cir. 2002).
Summer 2004] 1561
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 37:1555
5455 56 buos 57 Ibranch offices,54 local employees, attorneys, and distributors. In
order for a defendant to prove that the plaintiff has fraudulently-
joined a non-diverse party, the defendant bears the burden of
showing either that the plaintiff committed actual fraud in pleading
the jurisdictional facts, or that there is no claim against the non-
diverse defendant.5 8 Although there are circumstances under which
the defendant may prove actual fraud,5 9 the bulk of the case law
focuses on the second allegation, that the plaintiff had no claim
against the non-diverse defendant.
60
In determining that the plaintiff does not have a cognizable
claim, courts generally require that the defendant show by clear and
convincing evidence that there is no possibility that a plaintiff can
state a cause of action against the non-diverse defendant in state
court. 6  Fifth Circuit courts seem to give defendants more wiggle
53. See, e.g., Badon v. RJR Nabisco Inc., 236 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 2000).
54. See, e.g., Hugger v. Rutherford Inst., 63 Fed. Appx. 683 (4th Cir. 2003).
55. See, e.g., Mercado v. Allstate Ins. Co., 344 F.3d 458 (9th Cir. 2003)
(agents); Ross v. Citifinancial, Inc., 344 F.3d 458 (5th Cir. 2003) (agents); In
re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15479 (E.D. Pa. July
30, 2003) (sales representatives); United Computer Sys. v. AT&T, 298 F.3d
756 (9th Cir. 2002) (administrative employee of arbitration company).
56. See, e.g., Green v. Time-Life Libraries Inc., 65 Fed. Appx. 157 (9th Cir.
2003).
57. See, e.g., Lake Charles Diesel, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 328 F.3d 192
(5th Cir. 2003).
58. Ross, 344 F.3d at 458 (citing Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir.
2003)).
59. Fraud may be shown, for example, where the plaintiff includes a non-
diverse defendant that does not even exist or where the plaintiff misrepresents
a defendant's state of residence. See B., Inc., v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d
545, 551 n.14 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Hughes Constr. Co. v. Rheem Mfg. Co.,
487 F. Supp. 345 (N.D. Miss. 1980); Ray v. Bird & Son & Asset Realization
Co., 519 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1975)).
60. See, e.g., Ross v. Citifinancial, Inc., 344 F.3d at 458 (5th Cir. 2003);
Filla v. Norfolk S. Ry., 336 F.3d 806 (8th Cir. 2003); Great Plains Trust Co. v.
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2002); Badon v.
RJR Nabisco Inc., 236 F.2d 282 (5th Cir. 2000); Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco,
Inc., 138 F.3d 459 (2d Cir. 1998).
61. Pampillonia, 138 F.3d at 461. The Pampillonia court pointed out that
courts have various ways of articulating the same rule. See Sonnenblick-
Goldman Co. v. ITT Corp., 912 F. Supp. 85, 88 (S.D.N.Y 1996) ("In
evaluating the existence of fraudulent joinder, the Court must determine
whether the mere possibility exists that plaintiff can establish any cause of
action against a defendant."); Allied Programs Corp. v. Puritan Ins. Co., 592 F.
Supp. 1274, 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("Joinder will be considered fraudulent
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room, with an "arguably reasonable basis standard. 62 Under this
standard, there must be more than a "mere theoretical possibility"
that the plaintiff could have a cause of action against those joined.63
Despite this "reasonableness" language, the consensus seems to be
that even if the plaintiff has a colorable cause of action under state
law (that is, possible but speculative), courts rarely find fraudulent
joinder,64 partly because of the potential for Erie-type
65 problems. 66
Therefore, courts generally resolve all factual and legal issues in the
controlling substantive law in favor of the plaintiff at this stage 67 and
when it is established 'that there can be no recovery [against the defendant]
under the law of the state on the cause alleged."' (quoting Parks v. N.Y. Times
Co., 308 F.2d 474, 478 (5th Cir. 1962)); infra Part V.B.3.b.ii (discussing
various deficiencies in the plaintiff's pleading that defendants have relied on to
prove that the plaintiff did not have a cognizable claim).
62. See, e.g., Ross, 344 F.3d at 462; Great Plains, 313 F.3d at 312.
63. Ross, 344 F.3d at 462 (citing Great Plains, 313 F.3d at 312); Badon,
236 F.3d at 286 n.4 (rejecting contention that theoretical possibility of recovery
is enough to support no fraudulent joinder; citing "reasonable basis" standard);
Griggs v. State Farm Lloyds, 181 F.3d 694, 701 (5th Cir. 1999) ("While the
burden of demonstrating fraudulent joinder is a heavy one, we have never held
that a particular plaintiff might possibly establish liability by the mere
hypothetical possibility that such an action could exist.")).
64. Filla, 336 F.3d at 810 & n.10; Foslip Pharm., Inc. v. Metabolife, Inc.,
92 F. Supp. 2d 891, 903 (N.D. Iowa 2000).
65. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
66. See, e.g., Filla, 336 F.3d at 810-11; Badon, 236 F.3d at 286. Under
Erie, federal courts must apply state substantive law in diversity cases. Erie,
304 U.S. at 78-80. In determining whether or not the plaintiff has pled a
cognizable claim against the non-diverse defendant, the federal court looks at
the applicable state law. E.g., Filla, 336 F.3d at 810-11; Badon, 236 F.3d at
286. Where the state law is not conclusive on the issue, federal courts are
unwilling to "guess" at this stage of the trial, because if they guess wrong (i.e.,
holding that no claim exists) they would be ignoring the mandate of Erie by
failing to apply state law. E.g., Filla, 336 F.3d at 810-11; Badon, 236 F.3d at
286. Therefore, at this point in the trial, the court will resolve the issues in
favor of the plaintiff. E.g., Filla, 336 F.3d at 810-11; Badon, 236 F.3d at 286.
After reviewing the case on the merits, the court may yet decide that the claim
is barred by state law, and then dismiss the claim, which would not be
inconsistent with Erie.E.g., Filla, 336 F.3d at 810-11; Badon, 236 F.3d at 286.
67. See, e.g., Pampillonia, 138 F.3d at 461; Filla, 336 F.3d at 811; Fields v.
Pool Offshore, Inc., 182 F.3d 353, 357 (5th Cir. 1999). Courts use this same
approach where international law controls, as well. See, e.g., Marathon Oil Co.
v. Ruhrgas, A.G., 115 F.3d 315, 319-20 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that joinder
was not fraudulent where difficult issues of international law need to be
resolved in order to determine who could be true defendants).
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will give plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt where discovery is not
complete.
b. proving fraudulent joinder through legal doctrines
and pleading deficiencies
i. legal doctrines
While the defendant seeking removal bears a heavy burden,
defendants have found success with various legal doctrines and
deficiencies in the plaintiffs pleadings. For example, in
pharmaceutical failure to warn cases, the learned intermediary
doctrine may bar joinder of pharmacists. 69 Arbitral immunity may
block the joinder of a local attorney in a pro se action.70 Defendants
have been particularly successful in proving the fraudulent joinder of
local employees by showing the employees were not acting outside
the scope of agency, therefore precluding a basis of liability
independent of the company.71
ii. pleading deficiencies
As discussed, a defendant can prove the plaintiff fraudulently-
joined a party by showing that the plaintiff has no cognizable claim
against the suspect defendant. Defendants have been able to carry
this burden via deficiencies in the plaintiffs pleading. While the
removing party bears the burden of showing fraudulent joinder,
plaintiffs cannot "rest upon mere allegations in their pleadings,"
rather, the court may "pierce the pleadings '' 72 and look beyond their
face to determine if the plaintiff has a cognizable claim against each
defendant. In the absence of any proof, courts will not assume that
the nonmoving party will succeed in proving the necessary facts to
support his claims against the non-diverse defendant.
73
68. Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 649 (5th Cir. 2003).
69. Collins v. Am. Home Prods., 343 F.3d 765 (5th Cir. 2003).
70. Green v. Time-Life Libraries Inc., 340 F.3d 824 (9th Cir. 2003).
71. See, e.g., Mercado v. Allstate Ins. Co., 340 F.3d 824 (9th Cir. 2003);
Wiles v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 280 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 2002).
72. Ross v. Citifmancial, Inc., 344 F.3d 458,462 (5thCir. 2003).
73. Badon v. RJR Nabisco Inc., 224 F.3d 382, 394 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing
Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)).
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Courts have found fraudulent joinder where the plaintiff fails to
state a claim against the non-diverse defendant,74 where plaintiff
alleges many claims against many defendants and fails to specify
which defendant caused what harm,75 or where there is simply no
connection between the plaintiffs claim and the non-diverse
defendant.76 Claims against non-diverse defendants that are overly
conclusory also fail.77
c. fraudulently-joined plaintiffs
It is worth noting that while fraudulent joinder usually applies to
fraudulently-joined defendants, it may also apply to fraudulently-
joined plaintiffs. "Misjoinder [of plaintiffs] may be as fraudulent as
the joinder of a resident against whom a plaintiff has no possibility of
a cause of action. 78  To determine whether a plaintiff has been
fraudulently-joined, courts invoke the same principle as where a
defendant has been fraudulently-joined-whether the joined plaintiff
has a reasonable basis for recovery against the non-diverse
defendant.79
74. United Computer Sys. v. AT&T, 298 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 2002);
Whitaker v. Am. Telecasting, Inc., 261 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2001).
75. See Badon, 224 F.3d at 392-93; Gray v. Beverly Enters.-Miss., Inc.,
261 F. Supp. 2d 652, 661 (S.D. Miss. 2003); In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig.,
133 F. Supp. 2d 272, 282-83 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Hughes Constr. Co. v. Rheem
Mfg. Co., 487 F. Supp. 345, 348 (N.D. Miss. 1980) (citing Asher v. Pac. Power
& Light Co., 249 F. Supp. 671, 676 (N.D. Cal. 1965)).
76. Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423, 425 (5th Cir. 2003)
(evidence showed non-diverse doctor had not even treated the plaintiff); In re
Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15479, at *27-*29
(E.D. Pa. Jul. 30, 2003) (plaintiff's complaint failed to allege sales
representatives had any contact with plaintiffs or their doctors).
77. See, e.g., Badon, 224 F.3d at 392-93; Pampillonia, 138 F.3d at 461-62.
78. In re Diet Drugs, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15479, at *16-*18, *29-*32
(joinder of New Jersey plaintiff to class action to wreck diversity with
defendant resident of New Jersey was fraudulent); Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv.
Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1360 (11 th Cir. 1996), modified on other grounds, Cohen
v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069 (1 lth Cir. 2000); In re Benjamin Moore,
318 F.3d 626, 628-29 (5th Cir. 2002) (defendants claimed only four of
seventeen plaintiffs had a possibility of recovery against the non-diverse
defendants); In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 2002 WL 548750, at *2 (where
misjoinder of plaintiffs destroys diversity, court severs misjoined plaintiffs to
preserve defendant's right to remove).
79. In re Diet Drugs, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15479, at *17-*18.
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C. Restrictions on Removal Under § 1441(b)
Section 1441(b) specifies that all federal question cases may be
removed without regard to the parties' citizenship, but where
diversity is the basis for removal, defendants who are citizens of the
state in which the action was brought may not remove the case to
federal court.80 Section 1441(b) is read in tandem with § 1441(a),
imposing additional restrictions on the types of cases that can be
removed even if they could have originally been brought in federal
court.81 The effect of § 1441(b) is to limit the number of diversity
cases that make it to federal court, which is consistent with
Congress's intent to "restrict rather than to enlarge federal removal
jurisdiction.',
82
To determine whether or not the defendants are citizens of the
forum state, courts apply the same standards used to determine if
diversity exists for jurisdiction under § 1332. 83  A defendant
corporation is deemed to be a citizen of the state if it is incorporated
in the state, or if the corporation's principal place of business is
located in the state.8 4 A corporation's principal place of business is
ascertained by applying the "nerve center" test (applied where the
corporation's activities are spread out among various states), 5 the
"place of activity" or "muscle" test (where the corporation has a
collection of nerve cells in various states),86 or the "total activity"
test (a synthesis of the first two tests, which looks "to the nature,
location, importance, and purpose of a corporation's activities and
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2000). The rationale behind the restriction relates
to the idea that defendants may want to remove a case to federal court to avoid
in-state bias against them. If the defendant is a resident of the state in which
the suit is brought, the defendant presumably would not be the target of any
bias, eliminating the need for the defendant to remove the case. See Vairo,
supra note 21.
81. Morris v. TE Marine Corp., 344 F.3d 439, 444 (5th Cir. 2003).
82. Eriksen v. Moore Mill & Lumber Co., 157 F. Supp. 888, 889-90 (D.
Or. 1958) (referring to the revisor's notes accompanying § 1441).
83. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000). See supra Part II for a more detailed
discussion of diversity jurisdiction.
84. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
85. Tubbs v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 846 F. Supp. 551, 554 (S.D. Tex.
1994) (citing Scot Typewriter Co. v. Underwood Corp., 284 F. Supp. 862, 865
(S.D.N.Y. 1959)).




the degree to which those activities bring the corporation into contact
with the local community").87  A growing number of courts are
adopting the total activity test to determine the location of a
corporation's principal place of business.
88
D. Removal Under § 1441(c): Separate & Independent
Section 1441 (c) of the United States Code allows the removal of
otherwise non-removable separate and independent claims when
those claims are joined with a claim supported by § 1331 federal
question jurisdiction. 89 Removal under § 1441(c) is only available
when the claims are joined with a § 1331 federal question claim, and
therefore does not apply where the jurisdiction-conferring claim is
based on diversity.90 Removal under this section is very rare and can
create a procedural and constitutional minefield, which has prompted
some courts to declare removal under § 1441(c) altogether
unconstitutional. 9' As discussed below, the courts that do allow
87. Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 920 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing
Nauru Phosphate Royalties, Inc. v. Drago Daic Interests, Inc., 138 F.3d 160,
164 (5th Cir. 1998)). For a more in-depth discussion on the total activity test,
see J.A. Olsen v. City of Winona, 818 F.2d 401, 404-10 (5th Cir. 1987).
88. ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND
PROBLEMS 319 (2003). For a more detailed discussion on determining a
party's state of residence, see supra Part II.B.
89. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). Section 1441(c) is also used as a tool to remand
entire cases or individual claims to the state court. See infra Part V.E.
90. See, e.g., Nat'l Am. Ins. Co. v. Advantage Contract Servs., Inc., 200 F.
Supp. 2d 620, 622 (E.D. La. 2002); BJB Co. v. Comp. Air Leroi, 148 F. Supp.
2d 751, 754 (N.D. Tex. 2001); Baylor v. District of Columbia, 838 F. Supp. 7,
9 (D.D.C. 1993).
91. Fullin v. Martin, 34 F. Supp. 2d 726, 735 (E.D. Wis. 1999). See id. at
729-35 for a detailed discussion on the historical development of § 1441(c)
and accompanying analysis, which led the court to the conclusion that removal
of separate and independent claims that are not textually related to the federal
issue is unconstitutional. The court stated that allowing a federal court to take
jurisdiction over claims not textually related to the jurisdiction-conferring
federal claim would be inconsistent with article III, section 2. Id. To comply
with article III, section 2, supplemental jurisdiction is only proper where the
claims satisfy the "common nucleus of operative fact" test for supplemental
jurisdiction articulated by the Supreme Court in United Mine Workers of
America v. Gibbs, 282 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). Fullin, 34 F. Supp. 2d. at 729-
35; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367. This conflict is addressed in more detail infra
Part V.E.
Summer 2004] 1567
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1555
removal under § 1441(c) apply very different tests that lead to
inconsistent results.
1. Third-party defendants
While recognizing the potential for constitutional problems,
courts have allowed removal under § 1441(c) under narrow
circumstances. Fifth Circuit courts have afforded "third-party
defendants the opportunity of § 1441(c) removal to federal court,"
when "they could have removed when sued alone" (if, for example,
the original suit had been between the plaintiff and the third-party
defendant, as opposed to the original defendant).92 This tool is only
available to true third-party defendants who are new to the suit, and
is unavailable to an original plaintiff to the original claim, who only
becomes a counter-defendant after an original defendant files a
counterclaim against him.9 3 To allow ordinary counter-defendants to
remove in this manner "would fly in the face of the well-pleaded
complaint rule where the counter-defendants were the same parties
as the state court plaintiffs. 94 This application of § 1441(c) has been
very rare and narrowly construed,95 and the other circuits that have
considered the issue disagree as to whether third-party defendants
may seek removal under the statute.
96
92. Texas v. Walker, 142 F.3d 813, 816 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Carl Heck
Eng'rs v. Lafourche Parish Police Jury, 622 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1980)),
(allowing a third-party indemnity defendant to remove a case to federal court
pursuant to § 1441(c)); see also Jones v. Petty-Ray Geophysical Geosource,
Inc., 954 F.2d 1061, 1066 (5th Cir. 1991) (indemnification claims based on a
separate contract are separate and independent).
93. Walker, 142 F.3d at 816.
94. Id.
95. See United States v. Pate, No. CIV.A.7:01-CV-001164, 2002 WL
47900, at *2 (W.D. Va. Jan. 12, 2002) (unpublished memorandum opinion)
(declining to extend removal under § 1441(c) to counter-defendants who
although were not original plaintiffs, were substituted as plaintiffs sometime
during the proceedings).
96. Compare Walker, 142 F.3d at 816 (allowing a third-party indemnity
defendant to remove a case to federal court pursuant to § 1441(c)), and Jones,
954 F.2d at 1066 (holding indemnification claims based on a separate contract
are separate and independent), and Carl Heck, 622 F.2d at 136 ("If the third
party complaint states a separate and independent claim which if sued upon
alone could have been brought properly in federal court, there should be no bar
to removal."), with Lewis v. Windsor Door Co., 926 F.2d 729, 733 (8th Cir.
1991) (finding that § 1441(c) was not intended to effect the removal of a suit




Cases have also been properly removed under section 1441(c)
when the plaintiffs seek very different types of relief from a
defendant. In Eyak Native Village v. Exxon Corporation,97 the
defendants removed the case to federal court after multiple classes
joined their distinct claims (all of which arose from the Exxon
Valdez oil spill) into one class action.98 The court held that even
though the claims arose from a single wrong, the various claims met
the separate and independent test because some of the members of
the class were seeking "relief for the general public for damages to
the natural resources," whereas others "were seeking compensatory
relief for damages suffered by each member of their classes."
99
Similarly, in Justice v. Atchinson,1° ° the court held that the plaintiff s
injunction claim and damages claim were separate and independent,
despite the fact that both claims were filed in response to a single
defendant flooding their property.
101
478, 487-88 (7th Cir. 1984) (third-party defendants may not remove, and
Monmouth-Ocean Collection Serv., Inc. v. Klor, 46 F. Supp. 2d 385, 394
(D.N.J. 1999) ("[A]ny third-party claim for indemnification is not a claim
'separate and independent' from the main action, and therefore is not
removable by the third-party defendant under § 1441."), and Fullin v. Martin,
34 F. Supp. 2d 726 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (not recognizing a right to removal under
§ 1441(c) at all), and Fleet Bank-N.H. v. Engeleiter, 753 F. Supp. 417, 419
(D.N.H. 1991) (holding that Congress intended only that original defendants be
able to remove pursuant to § 1441(c)), and Sequoyah Feed & Supply Co. v.
Robinson, 101 F. Supp. 680, 682 (W.D. Ark. 1951) (holding that under a
"strict construction" of § 1441(c), third-party defendants may not remove to
federal court). For a related discussion dealing with how to interpret "joined"
as applied to third-party claims, see First Nat'l Bank of Pulaski v. Curry, 301
F.3d 456, 464-66 (6th Cir. 2002). The court adopted a narrow construction of
"joined" to apply only to claims joined by the plaintiff in the original state
court action, likely precluding all third-party claims from satisfying the
separate and independent requirement of § 1441 (c).
97. 25 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1102 (1995).
98. The basis for removal hinged on a previously filed consent decree,
which provided relief to the general public. The defendants contended that
continuing the litigation on issues of relief to the general public, "despite the
consent decree, raised a federal question of the construction of the consent
decree and whether the consent decree was res judicata as to the trust
plaintiffs' claims." Id. at 777.
99. Id. at 781.
100. 927 F.2d 502 (10th Cir. 1991).
101. Id. at 505.
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The test for "separate and independent" in Eyak and Justice is
inconsistent with tests articulated by other courts. In Eastus v. Blue
Bell Creameries, 102 the court defined separate as "the separateness of
the wrong to the plaintiff' and independent as a claim not involving
"substantially the same facts. 10 3  For example, in Eastus, the
plaintiff was fired from his job allegedly for requesting time off
because his wife was going to give birth. 1°4 The plaintiff brought
three claims against his employer, including tortious interference,
intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and a federal claim
based on the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). 10 5 The court
held that the IIED claim was not separate from the FMLA claim, as
the IED claim arose from the same single wrong to the plaintiff and
dealt with the same facts (his termination). 10 6 As for the tortious
interference claim, the court found that because this claim arose from
the defendant's alleged interference with the plaintiff's efforts to find
a new job, this claim was not based on a single wrong and dealt with
different facts.
10 7
Under this test, it seems that the claims in both Eyak and Justice
would be separate, because they deal with separate wrongs, but not
independent, as they arise from the same set of facts. This
inconsistency is yet another example of the complex and problematic
nature of § 1441(c).
E. The Remand Provision of§ 1441(c) and the Conflict with
§ 1367(a)
Once a court allows removal of a claim under § 1441(c), the
district court may adjudicate both the separate and independent claim
and the non-removable claim, or the district court "may remand all
matters in which State law predominates. ' 08 Eastus represents a
good application of this rule. 10 9  In Eastus, the Fifth Circuit
articulated the elements that are required for remand orders under
102. 97 F.3d 100 (5th Cir. 1996).
103. Id. at 104.
104. Id. at 100.
105. Id. at 103.
106. Id. at 105.
107. Id. at 106.
108. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2000).
109. Eastus v. Blue Bell Creameries, 97 F.3d 100 (5th Cir. 1996).
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§ 1441(c) to be proper: "the claim remanded must be (1) a separate
and independent claim or cause of action; (2) joined with a federal
question; (3) otherwise non-removable; and (4) a matter in which
state law predominates."
' 10
As discussed above, the Eastus court found that the IIED claim
was not separate and independent, but the tortious interference claim
was."' Since the IIED claim was not separate and independent, the
court held it could not be remanded under § 1441 (c).11 2 The tortious
interference claim did pass the court's separate and independent test,
was joined with a federal question (the FMLA claim), and was
otherwise non-removable (as there was no basis for diversity
jurisdiction and the claim did not form part of the same case or
controversy to qualify for supplemental jurisdiction)." 13 Even though
the claim survived the first three prongs, the court held that the claim
should be remanded as state law pre-dominated the issue. 114 As
discussed below, some courts view the discretionary decision to keep
the claim to be in direct conflict with the provisions of § 1367.115
Section 1367 is the statute that governs supplemental
jurisdiction.' 1 6 Under this section, a district court may only take
supplemental jurisdiction over "claims that are so related to claims in
the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the
same case or controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution." ' 1 7 The standard courts use to determine if a claim is
part of the same case or controversy is whether the claims are part of
a "common nucleus of operative fact."" 8 The common nucleus test
can be summarized as follows:
In particular, "[t]he state and federal claims must derive
from a common nucleus of operative fact." Thus, "if,
110. Id. at 104.
111. Id. at 105-06.
112. Id. at 105.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 106-07.
115. See28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000).
116. Id. For a complete discussion of § 1367, see supra Part IV.
117. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
118. See Rodriguez v. Doral Mortgage Corp., 57 F.3d 1168, 1175 (1st Cir.
1998) (articulating that common nucleus of operative fact test from United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966), was the proper test to
determine § 1367(a) inquiries).
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considered without regard to their federal or state character,
a plaintiffs claims are such that [she] would ordinarily be
expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then,
assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there is power
in federal courts to hear the whole."' 19
Therefore, when a court decides to adjudicate a separate and
independent claim under § 1441(c), it is taking jurisdiction over a
claim that is not part of the same case or controversy as the
jurisdiction-conferring federal question claim. Because of this, some
courts have reasoned that § 1441(c) is wholly inconsistent with §
1367, 12 and therefore unconstitutional, as it allows a federal court
jurisdiction over a claim outside of the scope of Article III. 121 On
the other hand, if § 1367 is regarded as simply codifying Gibb's
common nucleus test,122 then arguably the scope of cases included in
Article III may be broader than the scope of cases that meet the
supplemental jurisdiction requirements of § 1367.123 Under this line
of reasoning, separate and independent claims could be outside the
scope of § 1367 and inside the scope of Article III at once, therefore
making federal jurisdiction over these claims via § 1441(c) within
constitutional limitations.1
24
Notwithstanding this interpretation of § 1367, the apparent
conflict between § 1367 and § 1441(c) may explain why courts apply
different definitions to "separate and independent." As discussed,
some courts require only that the claims seek a different type of relief
in order for them to be considered separate and independent.
125
Because there is no requirement that the facts be unrelated, this type
of test may allow courts to narrowly squeak by the conflict with
§ 1367. The results in other courts, which have required different
119. Rodriguez, 57 F.3d at 1175-76 (quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725)
(citations omitted).
120. 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
121. See supra note 91 and accompanying text (discussing the
"unconstitutionality" of § 1441(c)).
122. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725. See supra Part IV.B.4 for a discussion on the
origin of § 1367.
123. U.S. CONST. art. III; 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
124. See supra Part IV.D.4 (collecting legal commentary on .the
interpretation of § 1367 and § 1441(c)).
125. See Eyak Native Vill. v. Exxon Corp., 25 F.3d 773, 781 (9th Cir. 1994),




types of relief and unrelated facts 126 necessarily come into direct
conflict with § 1367, as jurisdiction under § 1441(c) is only proper if
the facts are unrelated, and jurisdiction under § 1367(a) is proper
only if the facts are related.
F. Section 1446. Procedural Requirements for Removal
1. All defendants must generally join in removal
The well-settled rule that removal requires the consent of all
defendants 127 is consistent with the language of § 1446(a), which
specifies that a case may be removed "by the defendant or the
defendants."' 128 Despite this general rule, there are some situations
that do not require all defendants to join in removal, including
circumstances where a separate and independent claim is removed
under § 1441(c),129 where the defendant has not been served, or
where the defendant is a nominal or fraudulently-joined party.
1 30
a. exception for non-served defendants
Defendants are not required to join in a removal notice filed
before they have been served.13 1  This exception is sometimes
referred to as the "non-served defendant exception."' 32 After the
latter defendant is served, though, she must decide to "either accept
126. See Eastus v. Blue Bell Creameries, 97 F.3d 100, 104 (5th Cir. 1996).
127. See, e.g., Wis. Dep't of Corr. v. Schacht, 542 U.S. 381, 393 (1998)
(Kennedy, J., concurring); Loftis v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 342 F.3d 509,
516 (6th Cir. 2003); Marano Enters. of Kan. v. Z-Teca Rests., 254 F.3d 753,
754 (8th Cir. 2001); Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d
527, 533 n.3 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1076 (2002); Balazik v.
County of Dauphin, 44 F.3d 209, 213 (3d Cir. 1995); Doe v. Kerwood, 969
F.2d 165, 167 (5th Cir. 1992); Hewitt v. City of Stanton, 798 F.2d 1230, 1232
(9th Cir. 1986); N. Ill. Gas Co. v. Airco Indus. Gases, 676 F.2d 270, 272-73
(7th Cir. 1982); Cornwall v. Robinson, 654 F.2d 685, 686 (10th Cir. 1981).
128. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (2000).
129. See supra Part V.D.
130. See Courtney v. Benedetto, 627 F. Supp. 523, 526 (M.D. La. 1986)
(discussing the general rule and exceptions); McCurtain Co. Prod. Corp. v.
Cowett, 482 F. Supp. 809, 812-13 (E.D. Okla. 1978).
131. See Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1939).
132. See, e.g., Paz v. Bonita Tomato Growers, 920 F. Supp. 174, 175 (M.D.
Fla. 1996); Courtney, 627 F. Supp. at 526 n.6; Albonetti v. GAF Corp.-Chem.
Group, 520 F. Supp. 825, 827 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
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the removal or exercise [her] right to choose the state forum by
making a motion to remand."' 33 The standards courts use to
determine when a subsequently served defendant. must join the
removal notice vary, and are discussed in more detail below.'
34
b. exception for nominal or fraudulently-joined defendants
Consistent with the notion that fraudulently joined or nominal
parties are ignored when courts determine if complete diversity
exists, these parties are similarly ignored when defendants seek
removal. 135  While a nominal party's presence in the case is
technically proper, the court does not require a nominal party to join
in removal 136 since the party has nothing at stake. 137 On the other
hand, a fraudulently-joined defendant's presence in the case is
improper, and therefore it is just as irrelevant if these parties join in
removal. Courts determine whether the party is fraudulently-joined
using the same standards that are applied during the complete
diversity inquiry.'
38
2. Cases initially removable and the thirty-day time limit
Section 1446(b) requires that defendants file a notice of removal
within thirty days of receipt of the initial pleading, or within thirty
days of being served with the summons if the pleading has been filed
in the court and is not required to be served on the defendant.
139
While the language of the statute appears straightforward, courts
have been forced to interpret it more precisely to determine exactly
what circumstances start the thirty-day clock. There are three
instances where this determination is crucial to successful removal.
The first two instances deal with cases that are initially removable:
133. Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254, 1263 (5th Cir.
1988).
134. See infra Part V.F.2.b.
135. United Computer Sys. v. AT&T Corp., 298 F.3d 756, 762-63 (9th Cir.
2003).
136. Thorn v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 305 F.3d 826, 833 (8th Cir.
2002).
137. See Strotek Corp. v. Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., 300 F.3d 1129, 1133
(9th Cir. 2002).
138. See supra V.B.3; see also supra Part II for a more in-depth discussion
of diversity jurisdiction.
139. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000).
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first, where the court must decide whether the initial pleading or
summons is sufficient to start the clock, and second, where the case
involves multiple defendants served at different times. The third
instance involves situations where the case becomes removable
sometime after the initial pleading.
a. initial pleading and summons
Recently established parameters govern whether the pleading or
summons is sufficient to start the thirty-day clock."4 In Murphy
Bros. v. Michetti Pipe-Stringing, Inc.,141 the Supreme Court
addressed the scope of the word "otherwise" in § 1446(b), which
states that the defendant must file notice of removal thirty days after
receiving the complaint "through service or otherwise."' 142 The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had held that the plain meaning of
"otherwise" required that the thirty-day clock be triggered when the
defendant received constructive notice of the complaint via a faxed
"courtesy copy," not when the defendant was formally served.143
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "mere receipt of the
complaint unattended by any formal service" was insufficient to start
the thirty-day period. 44
The Court also articulated a "road map" for courts to follow
when determining at what point the thirty-day clock should start
running. 145  First, where the summons and complaint are served
together, the clock starts running immediately. 146 Second, where the
defendant first receives the summons, and then receives the
complaint at a later date, the clock is triggered upon receipt of the
complaint. 147 Third, where the defendant receives the summons and
the plaintiff is not required to serve the defendant with the complaint,
the clock will run when the complaint is made available through
140. See Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 353-
54 (1999); Whitaker v. Am. Telecasting, Inc., 261 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2001).
141. 526 U.S. 344 (1999).
142. 28 U.S.C. 1446(b).
143. Michetti Pipe Stringing v. Murphy Bros., 125 F.3d 1396, 1398 (11th
Cir. 1997), rev'd, 526 U.S. 344 (1999).
144. Murphy, 526 U.S. at 347-48.
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filing.' 48 Lastly, where the complaint is filed in court before any
service, the clock will run upon the defendant's receipt of the
summons. 
149
While the Murphy roadmap specified the complaint as the usual
clock-triggering pleading, the Second Circuit recently expanded the
scope of clock-triggering pleadings beyond the complaint. 150  In
Whitaker v. American Telecasting, Inc.,15 1 the court held that the
clock-triggering pleading need not specifically be a complaint, but
instead any pleading "containing sufficient information to enable the
defendant to intelligently ascertain the basis for removal."' 152 Since
the only pleading in the Whitaker case that contained the requisite
information was the complaint, it is not clear what other types of
pleadings would meet this requirement.
153
Under Murphy and Whitaker, as a general rule, unless the
plaintiff is only required to serve the defendant with a summons, the
defendant must remove within thirty days of receiving the complaint
or some other pleading that enables the defendant to determine the
removability of the action. This reading of the rule is in the interest
of fairness, as it gives defendants ample time to exercise their
removal rights by preventing plaintiffs from serving the defendant
with summons and then running out the clock before the defendant
can ascertain if removal is proper (or wise).
b. first-served rule v. last-served rule
When a case involves multiple defendants, the circuits are split
as to whether the thirty-day clock should start running when the first
defendant is served or when the last defendant is served. 154 The
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Whitaker v. Am. Telecasting, Inc., 261 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2001).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 198.
153. Id.
154. Compare Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478, 482 (5th Cir. 1986)
(adopting first-served rule), and Phoenix Container, L.P. v. Sokoloff, 235 F.3d
352, 353 (7th Cir. 2000) (upholding district court's ruling based on first-
served rule), with Marano Enters. of Kan. v. Z-Teca Rests., 254 F.3d 756, 762
(8th Cir. 2001) (applying last-served rule), and Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible
Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir. 1999) (same), and McKinney v.
Bd. of Trs. of Md. Cmty. Coll., 955 F.2d 924 (4th Cir. 1992) (same).
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The First Circuit Court of Appeals has not yet addressed the issue, and
the district courts are split. Compare Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 702 F. Supp.
19, 22 (D. Mass. 1988) (applying last-served rule), with Gorman v. Abbott
Labs., 629 F. Supp. 1196, 1201-02 (D.R.I. 1986) (applying first-served rule).
The Second Circuit is in a similar situation. Compare Quinones v.
Minority Bus Line Corp., No. 98-CIV. 7 167 (WHP), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5381, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 1999) (applying first-served rule), with Varela
v. Flintlock Constr., Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 297, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (applying
last-served rule).
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has not addressed the issue, but the
district courts have consistently held that the last-served rule is the proper test
in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Murphy Bros. v. Machetti Pipe
Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344 (1999). See Zollner v. Swan, No. 03-1110, 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9766, at *7 (E.D. Pa. May 13, 2003); Shadie v. Aventis
Pasteur, 254 F. Supp. 2d 509, 515 (M.D. Pa. 2003); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Bayer Corp., No. 02-343 gins, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12581, at *7-*8 (D.
Del. July 8, 2002); Orlick v. J.D. Carton & Son, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 2d 337, 343
(D.N.J. 2001). For a discussion on the rationale that the last-served rule is
consistent with Murphy, see infra Part V.F.2.b.ii.
The Ninth Circuit courts are split, as the Court of Appeals has not yet
addressed the issue. Compare McAnally Enters., Inc., v. McAnally, 107 F.
Supp. 2d 1223, 1226-28 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (collecting cases for both the "first-
served" and "last-served" rules and adopting the first-served rule), with Ford v.
New United Motors Mfg., 857 F. Supp. 707, 709 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (each
individual defendant has its own thirty-day period commencing on the day that
defendant is served). In United Computer Sys. v. AT&T Corp., 298 F.3d 756,
763 n.4 (9th Cir. 2003), the court acknowledged a split in the circuit, but
declined to express an opinion on the issue.
Although the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has not addressed the
issue, the district courts have consistently applied the first-served rule. See
Fastpro Int'l, Inc. v. Great Plains Software O.C., Inc., No. 01-2082-KHV, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5521, at *2-*3 (D. Kan. Apr. 10, 2001); Wakefield v. Olcott,
983 F. Supp. 1018, 1021 (D. Kan. 1997); McShares v. Barry, 979 F. Supp.
1338, 1342-43 (D. Kan. 1997); Scheall v. Ingram, 930 F. Supp. 1448, 1449
(D. Colo. 1996); Henderson v. Holmes, 920 F. Supp. 1184, 1186 (D. Kan.
1996).
Similarly, district courts in the Eleventh Circuit routinely apply the
first-served rule, while recognizing policy concerns under certain
circumstances that would subject the later-served defendant to inequitable
result. See Fitzgerald v. Bestway Servs., 284 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1315-16 (N.D.
Ala. 2003); Diebel v. S.B. Trucking Co., 262 F. Supp. 2d 1319, 1327-28
(M.D. Fla. 2003); Hooper v. Albany Int'l Corp., 149 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1318
(M.D. Ala. 2001).
The treatises on the issue are also divided. Compare 16 JAMES WM.
MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 107-30[3][a] (Daniel R. Cosquillette
et al. eds., 3d ed. 2004) (advocating the first-served rule), with 14c CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION §
3739, at 336-39 (3d ed. 1998) (advocating last-served rule).
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consequences of applying one test instead of the other are immense.
For example, suppose the first defendant is served on the first of
January, and the last defendant is served on second of February.
Suppose further that the first-served defendant fails to file a notice of
removal. Under the first-served rule, the thirty-day clock began
running on January first and the last-served defendant is precluded
from removing the case. On the other hand, under the last-served
rule, the clock would not start running until February second, and the
defendant will have thirty days from that date to file a notice to
remove if she desires to do so.
1 55
i. first-served rule
Under the first-served rule, also referred to as the "single date of
removal,"'156 the thirty-day clock begins running when the first
defendant is served. Supporters of this test reason that the removal
statutes must be strictly construed against removal because of the
significant federalism concerns inherent in federal removal
jurisdiction,157 and that courts must only take jurisdiction where the
removal action falls "squarely within the bounds Congress has
created.' '158 Furthermore, the first-served rule is consistent with the
unanimity rule,159 which requires all defendants to join in the
removal petition.' 60 The rationale is that if the first-served defendant
did not remove the case, then it is irrelevant whether or not the last-
served defendant wants to remove because the first-served
defendant's choice not to remove destroys the unanimity
requirement.161
Finally, jurisdictions that follow the first-served rule do not
apply the rule in situations where the first-served defendant has been
155. See McKinney, 955 F.2d at 928 (4th Cir. 1992).
156. Diebel, F. Supp. 2d at 1327 (M.D. Fla. 2003).
157. See Gaus v. Miles, 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992); Russell Corp. v.
Am. Home Assurance Co., 264 F.3d 1040, 1049 (1 1th Cir. 2001).
158. McAnally Enters., Inc. v. McAnally, 107 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1226 (C.D.
Cal. 2000) (citing Hom v. Serv. Merch. Co., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 1343, 1345
(N.D. Cal. 1990); quoting Phillips v. Allstate Ins. Co., 702 F. Supp. 1466, 1468
(C.D.Cal. 1989)).
159. See 28 U.S.C. 1446(a) (2000); see also supra Part V.F.1 for a more in-
depth discussion of the unanimity requirement.




fraudulently-joined. 162 Instead, the clock will begin running with
service of the first non-fraudulent defendant.
163
ii. last-served rule
Under the last-served rule, the thirty-day clock is not triggered
until the last defendant has been served. The first rationale for this
test is based on the language of the statute: if Congress had intended
the clock to start running when the first defendant is served, it would
have said so specifically, and courts should be reluctant to read
words into the statute. 164 Secondly, other courts have held that the
last-served rule is the only proper reading of the statute in light of the
Supreme Court's holding in Murphy.165 There, the Court held that a
defendant is not bound by the thirty-day time limit until that
defendant has been served with summons or the complaint.'
66
Courts applying the last-served rule hold that denying a later-served
defendant the right to remove would be inconsistent with Murphy, as
the defendant would be bound to a thirty-day time limit that was
triggered before the defendant was formally served.
167
Finally, courts also hold that fairness dictates application of the
last-served rule. For example, since removal petitions became
subject to Rule 11168 sanctions in 1988,169 it would be unfair to force
later-served defendants to "forego removal or join hurriedly in a
petition for removal and face possible Rule 11 sanctions.'
170
Furthermore, applying the first-served rule could create unfairness to
defendants by giving plaintiff's a "bag of tricks" to overcome
162. United Computer Sys., Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 298 F.3d 756, 762 (9th Cir.
2003).
163. Id.
164. See Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527, 533
(6th Cir. 1999).
165. See Marano Enters. of Kan. v. Z-Teca Rests., 254 F.3d 753, 756 (8th
Cir. 2001). See also the line of Third Circuit cases, discussed supra note 154,
which also rely on this rationale to support application of the last-served rule.
166. Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe-Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350
(1999).
167. Marano, 254 F.3d at 756.
168. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
169. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702,
§ 1016(b), 102 Stat. 4642, 4669-70 (1988).
170. McKinney v. Bd. of Trs. of Md. Cmty. Coll., 955 F.2d 924, 928 (4th
Cir. 1992).
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removal. 17 1 Such tricks could include serving an unsophisticated
defendant who is unlikely to remove first, and then waiting until the
thirty-day removal period expires to serve defendants that are likely
to seek removal. 172  The last-served rule, therefore, preserves a
defendant's right to remove, while still subjecting the defendant
seeking removal to the unanimity requirement of § 1446(a).173
Until the Supreme Court specifically addresses this issue, the
courts will likely continue to reach very different results when
determining when the thirty-day clock is triggered. Because the
consequences of each test have such a disparate impact on
defendants, whether the jurisdiction follows the first-served or last-
served rule may play a decisive role in where a plaintiff decides to
file her claim.
c. the revival exception
Even if a defendant fails to remove a case within the thirty-day
period, some courts allow removal under the judicially created
"revival exception" or "Wilson exception"' 74 to § 1446(b). 175 This
equitable exception has been narrowly applied to situations where
the plaintiff files an amended complaint that so changes the nature of
her action that the result is "substantially a new suit begun that
day.' 76 The revival exception only applies to cases that are initially
removed. 177
The revival exception is premised on the idea that the
defendant's willingness to litigate the original case in state court may
not mean the defendant would also choose to remain in state court to
171. Id.
172. Smith v. Mail Boxes, Etc., Inc., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1161 (E.D. Cal.
2002).
173. See 28 U.S.C. 1446 (a) (2003); see also supra Part V.F.1 for a more in-
depth discussion of the unanimity requirement.
174. The exception is sometimes referred to as the "Wilson Exception"
because the scope and definition of the exception was articulated in Wilson v.
Intercollegiate (Big Ten) Conference, 668 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1982). See infra
notes 184-186 and accompanying text for a discussion on the questioned
applicability of the exception after Congress's 1988 amendment to § 1446(b).
175. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
176. Johnson v. Heublein Inc., 227 F.3d 236, 242 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing




litigate a completely different claim.' 78  In order for the revival
exception to apply, the removal must not thwart the purposes of the
thirty-day rule.179 First, the removal must not allow the defendant
the tactical advantage of seeing how the case goes in state court
before removing °1 Second, the removal must not result in undue
delay and wastefulness by starting over in a second court after
significant proceedings have occurred in the first.1
8 '
Assuming that removal is consistent with the purposes of the
thirty-day rule, the amended complaint must be substantially
different from the original case for the revival exception to apply.
There is no hard and fast test to determine when a change is
substantial enough to trigger the exception; therefore courts must
determine what is substantial on a case-by-case basis.182 It seems the
changes must be substantively fundamental and radical to trigger the
exception, either by making the case much more complex, subjecting
the defendant to a much higher level of liability, or completely
realigning the parties.1
83
Some courts have questioned the applicability of the revival
exception after Congress's 1988 amendment to § 1446.184 This
amendment added the one-year limitation to cases that were not
initially removable. 85 These courts reason that the actual text of
§ 1446(b) and legislative history do not support the application of the
revival exception, as Congress intended that the 1988 amendment be
a "'modest curtailment in access to diversity jurisdiction."" 86 The
178. Id. (citing 14C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION § 3732, at 321 (3d ed. 1998)).
179. Id. (citing Wilson, 668 F.2d at 965).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Wilson, 668 F.2d at 965.
183. See, e.g., id.; Johnson, 227 F.3d at 242; Smith v. Hilton Hotel Corp.,
No. 03C388, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, 12366 at *7-*8 (N.D. Ill. 2003); Clegg
v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 285 B.R. 23, 31 (M.D. Fla. 2002); Baych v.
Herrick Douglass, 227 F. Supp. 2d 620, 623 (E.D. Tex. 2002).
184. See Messick v. Toyota Motor Mfg., Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 578, 581 (E.D.
Ky. 1999); Smith, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12366 at *6 n.2; Burke v. Atlantic
Fuels Mktg. Corp., 775 F. Supp. 474, 475-76 (D. Mass. 1991).
185. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000); Judicial Improvements and Access to
Justice Act, Pub.L. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988). See also infra Part V.F.3.b
for a more thorough discussion on the one-year rule.
186. Burke, 775 F. Supp. at 476-77 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 100-889, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 6032).
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application of the revival exception would be inconsistent with
Congress's intent to limit federal jurisdiction, as it would allow for
an increase in a defendant's access to diversity jurisdiction.
In any event, the revival doctrine remains good law, although its
application has been extraordinarily narrow.1 87 If nothing else, the
exception is yet another illustration of the profound competing
interests in the forum selection battle.
3. Cases that later become removable
a. the voluntary/involuntary rule
The second paragraph of § 1446(b) allows a defendant to
remove a case that, although not initially removable, becomes
removable through an amended pleading, motion, order or other
document. 188 The case may become removable either under federal
question or diversity jurisdiction, 189 and the defendant will have
thirty days from the receipt of the amended pleading, motion, order
or other document to file a notice of removal.
The case must only become removable, though, as a result of the
plaintiffs voluntary actions. 19 Stated differently, the defendant's
right to remove is not automatic, but is governed by the so-called
voluntary/involuntary rule, which only allows removal where the
plaintiff has affirmatively chosen a course of action that makes the
case removable. 191 The purposes of the voluntary/involuntary rule
are to promote judicial economy 192 and to allow the proper deference
to the plaintiffs choice of forum.1
93
187. In fact, Johnson v. Heublein Inc., 227 F.3d 236 (5th Cir. 2000), seems
to be the only case in which a federal court of appeals has upheld application
of the revival exception since 1956. See Cliett v. Scott, 233 F.2d 269, 271 (5th
Cir. 1956).
188. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
189. See id. at § 1331 for federal question jurisdiction requirements and id. §
1332 for diversity jurisdiction requirements.
190. See 16 JAMES WM. MOORE, supra note 154, § 107.30 [3][a][ii][B]-[c];
Great N. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 246 U.S. 276, 282 (1918).
191. Lungren v. Keating, 986 F.2d 346, 348 (9th Cir. 1993).
192. Poulos v. Naas Foods, Inc., 959 F.2d 69, 72 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing
Quinn v. Aetna.Life & Cas. Co., 616 F.2d 38, 40 n.2 (2d Cir. 1980)).
193. Id. (citing Insinga v. La Bella, 845 F.2d 249, 253 (11 th Cir. 1988); Self
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 588 F.2d 655, 659 (9th Cir. 1978)).
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Some defendants seeking removal have unsuccessfully
contended that the voluntary/involuntary rule was overruled when
Congress adopted § 1446(b) of the removal statute.1 94 Courts have
rejected this argument, finding that judicial economy and deference
to the plaintiffs choice of forum are still valid concerns.'
95
Furthermore, courts have found that Congress did not intend to
vitiate the rule when it adopted § 1446(b).
196
While all of the circuits that have addressed the issue
consistently hold that the voluntary/involuntary rule survived §
1446(b), the Second Circuit has defined "voluntarily" a bit more
broadly than other circuits. 197 Generally, the plaintiff must
affirmatively change the case in order for it to be voluntary. 198 The
Second Circuit also considers an amendment voluntary where the
removability of the case is the result of a decision of the court.199 If
the plaintiff decides not to appeal the court's decision, the court
considers the plaintiffs inaction a voluntary action that would make
the case removable. 20 For example, if the court dismisses a non-
diverse defendant creating complete diversity, and the plaintiff does
not appeal, the voluntary/involuntary test will be satisfied and the
defendant will now be able to remove. 20 1 Courts in other circuits
have commented that defining "voluntary" in this way does not
afford the plaintiff the proper deference in choice of forum,20 2 and
therefore require the plaintiff to be the party to actually sever the
non-diverse defendant in order for the case to become removable.0 3
194. See Poulos, 959 F.2d at 71-72; Higgins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 863 F.2d 1162, 1166 (4th Cir. 1988) (dictum); Quinn, 616 F.2d at 40 n.2
(dictum); In re Iowa Mfg. Co., 747 F.2d 462, 464 (8th Cir. 1984); DeBry v.
Transamerica Corp., 601 F.2d 480, 486-88 (10th Cir. 1979); Weems v. Louis
Dreyfus Corp., 380 F.2d 545, 548 (5th Cir. 1967).
195. See Poulos, 959 F.2d at 72.
196. Id.
197. See Id. at 72 n.3.
198. See 16 JAMEs WM. MOORE, supra note 154, § 107.30 [3][a][ii][B]-[c];
Great N. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 246 U.S. 276, 282 (1918).
199. Quinn, 616 F.2d at 40 n.2.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See Poulos, 959 F.2d at 72 n.3; Self, 588 F.2d at 660-65 (Ely, J.,
dissenting).
203. Poulos, 959 F.2d at 71-72.
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An exception to the rule exists where the non-diverse defendant
has been fraudulently joined.2 0 4 The voluntary/involuntary rule does
not apply where the plaintiff fraudulently joins a non-diverse
defendant. 20 5 There, if complete diversity is created when the court
dismisses the non-diverse, fraudulently-joined defendant, the
remaining defendants may remove the case even though the
dismissal was not the result of the plaintiff's voluntary action.20 6
Finally, note that there are two other situations where a case may
subsequently become removable. First, a case may also become
removable based on diversity jurisdiction where the plaintiff's initial
pleading did not exceed the amount in controversy requirement,
207
but the amount is satisfied at some later date.20 8 Second, a case may
become removable under federal question jurisdiction when a
subsequent document reveals that the plaintiff is asserting a claim
based on federal law.20 9 Just as where jurisdiction is based on
diversity, the defendant will not be required to file notice of removal
until thirty days after being able to ascertain that the plaintiff's claim
includes a question of federal law.
210
b. the one-year rule
As discussed, the second paragraph of § 1446(b) allows the
removal of a case that becomes removable sometime after the initial
pleading. 211 The section further specifies that when the basis for
204. Mayes v. Rapoport, 198 F.3d 457, 461 & n.9 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing
Insinga v. LaBella, 845 F.2d 249, 254 (1 1th Cir. 1988)).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See infra Part V.F.5 for a more detailed discussion of "jurisdictional
amount games."
208. See Chapman v. Powermatic, Inc., 969 F.2d 160, 161 (5th Cir. 1992)
(plaintiff did not include specific amount of damages in initial pleading, but
plaintiff s subsequent answer alleged damages upwards of $800,000; thirty-day
clock not triggered until defendant served with this document, as removability
was not ascertainable until then). But see Bosky v. Kroger Tex., LP, 288 F.3d
208, 210 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that "specific damage estimates that are less
than the minimum jurisdictional amount, when combined with other
unspecified damage claims, can provide sufficient notice that an action is
removable so as to trigger the time limit for filing a notice of removal.") (citing
Marcel v. Pool Co., 5 F.3d 81, 82-85 (5th Cir. 1993)).
209. See Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1994).
210. Id.
211. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000).
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removal is diversity jurisdiction, defendants must remove such cases
within one year after the commencement of the action.2 12 Congress
added the one-year rule to § 1446(b) in 1988 in an attempt to reduce
the number of diversity cases over which federal courts have
jurisdiction.2 13
i. first approach to the one-year rule: it applies only to cases not
initially removable
One approach to the one-year rule is to apply it only to cases
that were removable from the initial pleading. Every appellate court
that has considered the issue has adopted this approach.214 These
courts have reasoned that the textual structure of the statute dictates
such an interpretation because the clause is contained in the second
paragraph of the section, which applies only to cases not initially
removable.215
Adopting this interpretation could potentially have a favorable
impact on defendants who are later added to the action, or defendants
who are served late in the action. For example, suppose the plaintiff
commenced the suit and serves "Defendant A" on January 1, 2004 in
a jurisdiction that follows the last-served rule. Suppose further that
the case is initially removable based on diversity jurisdiction. The
plaintiff then serves "Defendant B" on February 2, 2005. Under this
interpretation of the rule, Defendant B would not be precluded from
removing the case to federal court, since the one-year rule would not
apply because the case was initially removable.
212. Id.
213. See id.; Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. 100-
702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988).
214. See Brown v. Tokio Marine and Fire Ins. Co., 284 F.3d 871, 873 (8th
Cir. 2002); Johnson v. Heublein Inc., 227 F.3d 236, 241 (5th Cir. 2000);
Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527, 534-35 (6th Cir.
1999); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Deshotel, 142 F.3d 873, 886 (5th Cir. 1998);
Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d 1313, 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
215. See Ritchey, 139 F.3d at 1316 (finding that the "most sound reading of a
sentence will refer its limiting clause back to the antecedent clause to which it
is attached, and not to other paragraphs or sentences in the statute").
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ii. second approach to the one-year rule: it applies to all cases
regardless of whether the case was initially removable
Although no court of appeals has adopted this approach, a
number of district courts have held that the one-year limitation
should apply to all diversity cases, whether initially removable or
216 217not. In Ariel Land Owners, Inc. v. Dring, a district court in the
Third Circuit questioned the logic of interpreting the rule as applying
only to cases not originally removable based only on the "plain
meaning" of the statute.2 18  The Ariel court found recent U.S.
Supreme Court decisions 219  and the "weight of contrary
interpretations in lower courts and learned treatises" 220 demanded a
contrary interpretation. 22' Furthermore, the court reasoned that
applying this broad meaning of the rule was consistent with
legislative history.
222
Although no court of appeals has adopted this meaning of the
one-year rule, the frequency of its application in the district courts
may indicate that the rationale behind interpreting the rule this way is
gaining some momentum.223 That, coupled with the fact that the
courts of appeals in only four circuits224 have weighed in on the
issue, may signal a potential circuit split. Only time will tell which
version of the rule the other circuits will adopt-as discussed above,
the version adopted by the remaining circuits could lead to very
different results for defendants seeking removal and plaintiffs
seeking to keep their cases in state court.
216. See Ariel Land Owners, Inc. v. Dring, 245 F. Supp. 2d 589, 597-98 &
n.18 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (citing a number of federal district court cases which
have applied the rule to all diversity cases), revd on other grounds, 351 F.3d
611 (3d Cir. 2003).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 593.
219. Id. at 593-96.
220. Id. at 597-98.
221. Id. at 593.
222. Id. at 597-98.
223. The Ariel court cites district court cases from six different circuits that
have applied the one-year rule to all diversity cases. See id. at 597-98 & n. 18.
Furthermore, a district court in the Tenth Circuit recently followed Ariel,
applying the same version of the rule, bringing the number to seven. See
Caudill v. Ford Motor Co., 271 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1327 (N.D. Okla. 2003).
224. See supra note 214 (listing the circuits in which the Courts of Appeals
have applied the rule only to cases that are not initially removable).
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iii. equitable exception to the one-year rule
In Tedford v. Warner-Lambert,225 the Fifth Circuit held that the
one-year limitation was not absolute, but flexible and subject to
"equitable tolling" where the plaintiff was apparently trying to
manipulate the forum.226 The court reasoned that a strict application
of the one-year rule would encourage plaintiffs to join non-diverse
defendants until the one-year clock expired, simply to avoid federal
jurisdiction, undermining the very purpose of diversity
jurisdiction.
227
While no other court of appeals has specifically addressed this
issue, at least two have hinted in dicta that the one-year limitation
would be an absolute bar to the removal of cases where jurisdiction
is based on diversity. 228 District courts that have addressed the issue
have reached different conclusions, some holding that an equitable
exception to the rule is proper, others holding it is not.
229
Once again, the inconsistencies in the application of the removal
statutes illustrate the competing interests at play. Courts obviously
struggle to balance the plaintiff s interest in choosing a forum against
the defendant's right to remove. This tension is not surprising when
one considers the variance in win-rates when the plaintiff
successfully keeps her case in state court, as opposed to when the
defendant successfully removes the case to federal court.23 °
4. Waiving the right to remove
As illustrated thus far, defendants often fight fiercely to exercise
their right to remove, but there are situations under which a
defendant may waive her right to remove. First, a defendant will
waive her right to remove if she fails to file notice of removal within
225. Tedford v. Warner-Lambert, 327 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2003).
226. Id. at 426-27.
227. Id. at 427.
228. See Lovern v. Gen. Motors. Corp., 121 F.3d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 1997)
(stating in dicta that the one-year rule was "an absolute bar to removal of cases
in which jurisdiction is premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1332"); Bums v. Windsor Ins.
Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1097 n.12 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating in dicta that "Congress
has recognized and accepted that, in some circumstances, plaintiff can and will
intentionally avoid federal jurisdiction").
229. See Tedford, 327 F.3d at 426 n.4 (citing various district courts that have
reached opposite decisions).
230. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 2.
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the time limitations required by § 1446(b).2 3 Second, the defendant
may waive the right by contract if the defendant and plaintiff enter
into an agreement, granting the plaintiff the right to choose the
forum. Third, a defendant may also waive the right to remove if she
participates in the state court proceedings. Whether the alleged
waiver is by contract or by participating in the state court
proceedings, courts generally insist that the removal waiver be clear
and unambiguous.
232
a. waiver by contract
Waiver by contract usually takes the form of a forum selection
clause included in a contract between the parties. Because forum
selection clauses may address personal jurisdiction, venue in a
specific region, or the party's right to removal, courts generally
require that the provision must make it clear that the defendant
intended to waive her right to removal.233 While courts require
clarity, they generally do not require the language to explicitly read
"waiver of right of removal. 234
To determine whether or not the party intended to waive his
removal rights, courts generally look to methods of interpretation
that are applied to contract disputes.235 These methods may include
construing the language against the drafter, deciding whether or not
the language reflects typical "boilerplate" language, determining the
ordinary meaning of the terms at issue, and ascertaining the intention
231. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000); see also Murphy Bros. v. Michetti
Pipe-Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 356 (1999) (a defendant's procedural rights
"slip away" if defendant fails to file notice of removal within thirty days of
service).
232. See, e.g., EIE Guam Corp. v. Long Term Credit Bank of Japan, Ltd.,
322 F.3d 635, 649 (9th Cir. 2003); Waters v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 252 F.3d
796, 797 (5th Cir. 2001).
233. See, e.g., Waters, 252 F.3d at 797; In re Delta Am. Re Ins. Co., 900
F.2d 890, 892 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing Regis Assocs. v. Rank Hotels, Ltd., 894
F.2d 193, 195 (6th Cir. 1990)).
234. Waters, 252 F.3d at 797 (citing City of Rose City v. Nutmeg Ins. Co.,
931 F.2d 13, 15 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 908 (1991); Gen.
Phoenix Corp. v. Malyon, 88 F. Supp. 502, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Perini Corp.
v. Orion Ins. Co., 331 F. Supp. 453,454-55 (E.D. Cal. 1971)).
235. See Delta, 900 F.2d at 892-95.
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of the parties and the degree to which the term had been
negotiated.236
Despite the guidance provided by these methods of
interpretation, the level of specificity required for the defendant to
waive his right to removal by contract varies from court to court.
Some hold that language to the effect of "the plaintiff has the right to
choose the forum" is enough,237 while others require the language to
be more precise to constitute a waiver.238 Because of this, parties to
a contract should be very specific in order to protect their forum
selection or removal rights.
b. waiver by participating in state court proceedings
A defendant may also waive his right to remove if he
substantially participates in state court proceedings. The general rule
is that the defendant's waiver can only be demonstrated by a "clear
and unequivocal" intent to remain in state court2 3 9 that should
only be found in "extreme situations." 240  Courts have held that
defendants will not waive the right to remove by participating in
state court proceedings "short of seeking an adjudication on the
merits." 241 The holdings suggest the defendant's intent is to be
determined through his affirmative acts and nothing else; even where
a defendant led the plaintiff to believe he would not remove the case,
the court held the defendant did not show the requisite intent
required to waive his right.242  Even if the defendant takes
substantive defensive action in the state court after filing notice of
removal, courts have held that the right is not waived, as a defendant
"could not waive a right it had already exercised. '243
236. See id.
237. See Waters, 252 F.3d at 798.
238. See Regis Assocs. v. Rank Hotels Mgmt., Ltd., 894 F.2d 193, 195 (6th
Cir. 1990) (holding that a defendant's right to removal is absolute barring
precise and unequivocal language to the contrary).
239. See, e.g., EIE Guam Corp. v. Long Term Credit Bank of Japan, Ltd.,
322 F.3d 635, 649 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Resolution Trust Corp. v. Bayside
Developers, 43 F.3d 1230, 1240 (9th Cir. 1994)); Grubb v. Donegal Mut. Ins.
Co., 935 F.2d 57, 59 (4th Cir. 1991); Rothner v. City of Chi., 879 F.2d 1402,
1415-16 (7th Cir. 1989) (superceded by statute on other grounds).
240. See Rothner, 879 F.2d at 1415-16.
241. Tedford v. Warner-Lambert, 327 F.2d 423, 428 (5th Cir. 2003).
242. See EIE Guam, 322 F.3d at 649.
243. Aqualon Co. v. MAC Equip. Inc., 149 F.3d 262, 264 (4th Cir. 1998).
Summer 2004] 1589
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 37:1555
The Supreme Court has stated that "waiver is the intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right."244  Requiring
clear and unequivocal evidence that the defendant intended to waive
this right is consistent with this. Because the statutes in the United
States Code govern the removal process, and those statutes confer to
the defendant the right to remove, it follows that the defendant would
maintain this right unless there was clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary. Until the defendant's right to remove begins butting
heads with other interests of the legal system, namely, judicial
economy, this right will not be vitiated. Therefore, unless the
defendant substantively participates in the state court action to the
extent that it would be a waste of judicial resources to start the case
over in a brand new court, it is unlikely that a court would find that
the defendant waived his right to remove.
245
5. Jurisdictional amount games
246
For a federal court to have jurisdiction over a case based on
diversity of citizenship, § 1332 of the United States Code requires
that the amount in controversy exceed $75,000, exclusive of interest
and costs. 2 47 Therefore, in order for a defendant to remove a case
based on § 1332, this minimum likewise must be exceeded. While
this requirement seems straightforward, situations arise where the
amount in controversy inquiry becomes problematic. For example,
how does a defendant remove if the plaintiff has not alleged a
specific amount of damages? What if the plaintiff alleges damages
of $74,999 to avoid federal jurisdiction? Can potential punitive
damages or attorney fees be added to this? What if the plaintiff
alleges damages for less than $75,000, and the defendant offers to
settle for $100,000? Does the settlement offer become the new
amount in controversy? As these scenarios illustrate, the amount in
244. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993).
245. See Rothner, 879 F.2d at 1416 (indicating that instances where the
defendant waives its rights to removal will be rare and limited to extreme
situations).
246. This term is used by Professor Georgene Vairo to refer to the back and
forth actions of plaintiffs and defendants to either avoid or satisfy the
minimum amount in controversy requirement established by 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(2000). See Vairo, supra note 21, at 289.
247. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000).
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controversy is yet another removal issue highlighting the forum-
selection battle.
a. plaintiff does not specify amount of damages or alleges
damages below the jurisdictional minimum
When a plaintiff's initial pleading does not specify the amount
of damages, the defendant has two options with regard to removal.
First, the defendant may serve the plaintiff with a set of
interrogatories, requesting that the plaintiff specify the amount of
damages. When the plaintiffs answer indicates the damages exceed
$75,000, the case is removable under the § 1446(b).248
Second, where the amount in controversy is not satisfied
(because it is either not specified or insufficient), the defendant may
choose to remove the case anyway. This option is necessitated in
some jurisdictions where state law does not allow the plaintiff to
specify the exact numerical value of the damage claim.249 In this
situation, the defendant seeking removal must show that the amount
in controversy exceeds $75,000.250 To meet this burden, the
defendant may either demonstrate that it is "facially apparent" that
the claims are likely above $75,000, or the defendant may set forth
the facts in controversy that support a finding of the requisite
amount.25 1  The defendant will not meet this burden by simply
making a conclusory statement that the plaintiff seeks damages in
excess of $75,000.252
248. See supra Part V.F.3 (discussing what happens when an originally non-
removable case becomes removable).
249. Luckett v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 171 F.3d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 1999).
250. While it is widely accepted that the party seeking federal jurisdiction
bears the burden of showing that jurisdiction is proper, there is disagreement
among the circuits as to what that the burden of proof should be. See
Watterson v. GMRI, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 2d 844, 847-49 (S.D. W. Va. 1997), for
an in-depth discussion of the standards applied by various circuits.
251. Luckett, 171 F.3d at 298 (citing Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d
1326, 1335 (5th Cir. 1995)).
252. See, e.g., Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir. 1992);
Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001); White v. FCI
USA, Inc., 319 F.3d 672, 675 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Asociacion Nacional de
Pescadores a Pequena Escala o Artesanales de Colombia (ANPAC) v. Dow
Quimica De Columbia S.A., 988 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1993)).
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b. proving the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000
As outlined above, a defendant may prove the controversy
exceeds the minimum either by showing it is facially apparent, or
through the facts of the case.253 One way defendants have done this
is by using post-complaint settlement letters from the plaintiff, which
demand a settlement in excess of $75,000.254 Courts have held that
settlement offers are relevant to determining the amount in
controversy if they reasonably reflect an estimate of the plaintiffs
claim.
255
Punitive damages can generally be added to a plaintiffs alleged
amount of compensatory damages to meet the jurisdictional
minimum.256 If the plaintiff alleges compensatory damages that fall
short of the jurisdiction minimum, a court must determine if the
amount of punitive damages required to exceed the minimum could
reasonably be sustained.257 Although punitive damages may be
considered to exceed the jurisdictional minimum, in the case of a
class action suit, those damages may not be aggregated.258
253. Luckett, 171 F.3d at 298 (citing Allen, 63 F.3d at 1335).
254. See Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding
plaintiff s settlement offer for $100,000 was a reasonable basis for defendant
to show amount in controversy exceeded minimum); Addo v. Globe Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 230 F.3d 759, 761-62 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that a post-
complaint demand letter constitutes "other paper" under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)
for purpose of ascertaining the amount in controversy). But see In re Minn.
Mut. Life Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litig., 346 F.3d 830, 835 (8th Cir. 2003)
("Although [plaintiff's] letter offers further support for the valuation of the
claims, we do not decide here whether a post-complaint settlement offer alone
is sufficient to establish the requisite amount in controversy.").
255. Cohn, 281 F.3d at 840 (citing Chase v. Shop 'N Save Warehouse
Foods, Inc., 110 F.3d 424, 428-30 (7th Cir. 1997) (the plaintiffs settlement
offer is properly consulted in determining "plaintiff's assessment of the value
of her case"); Bums v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1097 (1 1th Cir. 1994)
(holding that while a "settlement offer, by itself, may not be determinative, it
counts for something"); Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 651 n.8 (5th Cir. 1994)
("Because the record contains a letter, which plaintiffs counsel sent to
defendants stating that the amount in controversy exceeded $50,000, it is
'apparent' that removal was proper.")).
256. Bell v. Preferred Life Assurance Soc'y, 320 U.S. 238, 240 (1943).
257. See Smith v. Am. Gen. Life and Accident Ins. Co., Inc., 337 F.3d 888,
895-96 (7th Cir. 2003).
258. See, e.g., Ayres v. Gen. Motors Corp., 234 F.3d 514, 517 (11th Cir.
2000); Lindsey v. Ala. Tel. Co., 576 F.2d 593, 594 (5th Cir. 1978).
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Finally, attorney fees are generally not included in the amount in
controversy calculation. 259 An exception to the rule exists where the
parties are contractually bound, and a term of the contract provides
that one party will cover the attorney fees of another in the event of
litigation.260 As with punitive damages, the attorney fees of partiesin a class action may not be aggregated.26'
c. removal can be precluded even when amount in controversy
exceeds minimum
If a defendant successfully shows that the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000, she may remove unless the plaintiff has shown to a
legal certainty that her recovery cannot exceed the minimum. In De
Aguilar v. Boeing Co.,262 the Fifth Circuit speculated as to how a
plaintiff might meet the legal certainty obligation:
Plaintiff's state complaint might cite, for example, to a state
law that prohibits recovery of damages that exceed those
requested in the ad damnum clause and that prohibits the
initial ad damnum to be increased by amendment. Absent
such a statute, "[1litigants who want to prevent removal
must file a binding stipulation or affidavit with their
complaints; once a defendant has removed the case, St.
Paul makes later filings irrelevant.,
263
Courts have stressed that this is not a burden-shifting exercise,
but instead a requirement that the plaintiff make all information
known at the time of the pleading.264
259. 12 JAMES WM. MOORE,supra note 154, § 57.21.
260. See Springstead v. Crawfordsville State Bank, 231 U.S. 541, 542
(1913).
261. See Coghlan v. Wellcraft Marine Corp., 240 F.3d 449, 455 n.5 (5th Cir.
2001).
262. 47 F.3d 1404 (5th Cir. 1995).
263. Id. at 1412 (quoting In re Shell Oil Co., 970 F.2d 355, 356 (7th Cir.
1992) (per curiam); referring to St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co.,
303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938) (questioned on other grounds)).
264. Id.
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G. Section 144 7-Remand Procedure
1. Grounds for remand
Section 1447 of the United States Code governs the procedural
265requirements for remanding a case to state court. A case may be
remanded at any time for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In
addition, remand is also appropriate where there has been a defect in
the removal process. 266 While the court may unilaterally remand a
case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff must be the
party to remand where the basis for remand is a defect in the removal
procedure. Defects in removal procedure can include instances
where: all defendants fail to join in removal;267 defendants fail to
remove within thirty-days of being served;268 or defendants fail to
remove a newly removable case based on diversity within one year
of the commencement of the suit.
269
Non-compliance with the removal statutes is the major source of
removal defects, but there are also removal defects that are not based
on the statutes. For example, a court may remand where the
defendant waives the right to remove. 270 A court may also remand if
removal was in violation of a forum selection clause. 271 Removal
may also be defective where the defendant removes despite a
statutory proscription against such removal.272
Furthermore, parties may allege other procedural defects not
contemplated in the removal statutes. For example, in Wiles v.
273Capitol Indemnity Corp., the plaintiff argued that the removal wasdefective because defendants based removal on § 1446274 (which
265. 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (2000).
266. See Caterpillar v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 76-77 (1996).
267. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). See supra Part V.F.1 for a more detailed
discussion of the unanimity rule.
268. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). See supra Part V.F.2 for a more detailed
discussion of the thirty-day rule.
269. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). See supra Part V.F.3.b for a more detailed
discussion of the one-year rule.
270. See supra Part V.F.4 for a more detailed discussion of the waiving the
right to remove.
271. Foster v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., 933 F.2d 1207, 1214 (3d Cir. 1991).
272. Williams v. AC Spark Plugs Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 985 F.2d 783,
787 (5th Cir. 1993).
273. 280 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 2002).
274. 28 U.S.C. § 1446.
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prescribes the procedure for removal)275 instead of § 1441 (which
sets the grounds for removal).276 The court rejected this argument,
holding that "[a]lthough [the defendant] should have cited § 1441 as
part of its grounds for removal, its failure to do so did not deprive the
court of removal jurisdiction because the § 1441 jurisdictional
requirements were nonetheless met.', 2 77 Although the Wiles court
rejected the plaintiffs position, the case is yet another illustration of
a litigant fighting for her choice of forum, as well as an illustration of
the vast amount of confusion that surrounds the removal statutes.
2. Timing for remand
As mentioned above, there are no time limits for remand based
278on subject matter jurisdiction. However, a motion to remand
based on a procedural defect must be made within thirty days.279
Note that the party seeking remand is not always the plaintiff. In
Loftis v. United Parcel Service,280 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
recently held that under certain situations a codefendant may be able
to seek remand as well as a plaintiff.281 There, a codefendant timely
filed a motion to remand a case that was removed by other
defendants without his consent. The court held that a "frank
opposition to removal by a codefendant who affirmatively seeks a
remand within the thirty-day period satisfies the prerequisite of a
motion, and empowers the district court to enforce the unanimity
requirement."
282
275. Wiles, 280 F.3d at 871.
276. 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
277. Id.
278. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) ("If at any time before final judgment it
appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be
remanded.") (emphasis added); see also Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61,
76-77 (1996) (the court may remand the case at any time for problems with
subject-matter jurisdiction).
279. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see also Caterpillar, 519 U.S. at 76-77 (the
plaintiff must file a motion for remand within thirty days of removal motion
for defects in removal).
280. 342 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2003).
281. Id. at 517.
282. Id.
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3. Waiving the right to remand
As is the case with removal, a party may waive the right to seek
remand. First, if a party fails to file a motion to remand the case
within thirty days after the defendant files the notice of removal, the
party will lose its right to seek remand.283 Second, a party may
waive the right to seek remand by contract, if for example, the parties
entered into contract including a forum selection clause.284 Third,
the party may waive the right to seek remand by substantially
participating in the federal court action.285
4. Remanding under § 1447: attorney fees and costs
If a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction or there has been a
legitimate defect in removal procedure and the plaintiff has timely
filed a motion to remand, the court will remand that case to the state
286court. Section 1447(c) provides that an "order remanding the case
may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including
attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal." The rationale
behind this provision of the statute is to compensate a plaintiff for
additional expenses incurred when the defendant improperly
removes a case to federal court.287 The plaintiff will not receive
costs it would have incurred if the case had remained in state court,
but is compensated only for the increased costs of moving to federal
288court. This provision promotes judicial economy by providing a
disincentive for parties with deep pockets to bounce from federal to
state court until their adversaries run out of money, effectively
ending the litigation.
In order for a court to award fees, it must find that the removal
was not fairly supported by the merits of the case.289 The courts of
appeals have allowed the district courts broad discretion awarding
283. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 2003); Smith v.
Amedisys, Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 439 n.1 (5th Cir. 2002); Patin v. Allied Signal,
77 F.3d 782, 786 (5th Cir. 1996).
284. For a more detailed discussion on waiver by contract, see supra Part
V.F.4.a.
285. For a more detailed discussion on waiver by participating in court
proceedings, see supra Part V.F.4.b.
286. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (2000).
287. See Baddie v. Berkeley Farms, 64 F.3d 487, 490 (9th Cir. 1995).
288. See id.
289. See Schmitt v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 845 F.2d 1546, 1552 (9th Cir. 1988).
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fees when they concluded there is no reasonable basis for removal.
For example, the court may include the fees in the remand order or in
some supplemental order.290 The court may award fees to plaintiffs
or defendants depending on which party was responsible for the
improper removal. 291 The court may award fees despite the fact that
the defendant withdrew his case and voluntarily stipulated to a
remand.292 Once the court determines removal was improper, the
only limitation imposed on the district courts is that the award reflect
the actual expenses incurred by the party because of the removal, as
opposed to reasonable attorney fees.
293
5. Section 1447(d)-reviewability of remand orders
Section 1447(d) states that "an order remanding a case to the
State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or
,294otherwise." A party cannot circumvent the rule by seeking review
via a writ of mandamus.295 This bar on reviewing remand orders is
presumably rooted in the idea that if the district court remanded due
to lack of jurisdiction, the appellate court would likewise have no
constitutional authority to consider the case. However, there are
290. Wisconsin v. Hotline Indus., 236 F.3d 363, 365 (7th Cir. 2000)
291. The court outlined cases awarding fees against defendants:
See Vaughan, 227 F. 364 (removal based on diversity improper
because plaintiff mispled residency in complaint); Duarte v.
Donnelley, 266 F. Supp. 380, 384 (D. Haw. 1967) (removal improper
because amount in controversy was below jurisdictional limit);
Barraclough v. ADP Automotive Claims Servs., Inc., 818 F. Supp.
1310 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (removal improper because plaintiffs only
federal claim was, by her own admission, frivolous). But see Clark v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 583 (W.D. Mo. 1953) (remand
forced by plaintiff's subsequent amendment of complaint to join a
local defendant).
Baddlie, 64 F.3d at 490 n.2.
292. See Hotline Indus., 236 F.3d at 365.
293. See id. at 366-68.
294. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2000); Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca,
516 U.S. 124 (1995); see also Severonickel v. Gaston Reymenants, 115 F.3d
265, 268-69 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that there is no review even if district
court's order is erroneous); Krangel v. General Dynamics Corp., 968 F.2d 914,
916 (9th Cir. 1992) (same). Note that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) provides an
exception for civil rights actions removed via § 1443, which are not at issue in
this Article.
295. See In re Benjamin Moore & Co., 318 F.3d 626, 631 (5th Cir. 2002).
For a more detailed discussion on writs of mandamus, see infra Part VI.C.
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circumstances where remand orders are reviewed. As outlined
below, these exceptions generally deal with circumstances where
jurisdiction is not at issue and therefore the danger of the appellate
court overstepping its constitutional boundaries is not so profound.
While any exception to the rule seems inconsistent with the language
of the statute, these exceptions are consistent with the presumed
purpose of the statute.
First, note that the bar against reviewing orders to remand does
not apply to refusals to remand, due to subject matter jurisdiction
concerns. 296  While not really an exception to the rule (because
refusals to remand are not included in the bar), this practice is more
the mirror image of § 1446(d). If remand orders are not to be
reviewed because -the appellate court would lack jurisdiction, it
follows that refusals to remand should be reviewed to ensure that the
district court does have the authority to hear the case.
Many of the exceptions deal with instances where the district
court (at least at some point) had subject matter jurisdiction over the
case. Section 1447(d) will not bar appellate review of a district
court's discretionary decision not to exercise jurisdiction,297 and the
appellate court is not bound by the district court's characterization of
its authority to remand.298 On a related point, appellate review is
permitted where the original removal was proper, but the district
court remanded at some point post-removal because it lost subject-
matter jurisdiction.299
296. See, e.g., Caterpillar v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 76 (1996); USX Corp. v.
Adriatic Ins. Co., 345 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2003).
297. See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712 (1996);
First Nat'l Bank v. Curry, 301 F.3d 456, 460 (6th Cir. 2002); Tuscon v. U.S.
W. Communications, Inc., 284 F.3d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 2002); Ferrari,
Alvarez, Olsen & Ottoboni v. Home Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 550, 553 (9th Cir.
1991).
298. See Abada v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., 300 F.3d 1112, 1117 (9th
Cir. 2002).
299. See Long v. Bando Mfg. of Am., Inc., 201 F.3d 754, 758-59 (6th Cir.
2000) (holding that appellate jurisdiction to consider remand order existed
where district court remanded remaining state law claims after dismissal of
plaintiff's federal-law claims in federal question case); see also Van Meter v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 1 F.3d 445, 450 (6th Cir. 1993) ("If a district court
determines subject matter jurisdiction to have existed at the time of removal,
yet remands for alleged lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on some post-
removal event(s), the remand order is... reviewable....").
1598
REMOVAL AND REMAND
Additionally, an order to remand may be reviewable if it was
based on the resolution of any substantive issue independent of the
jurisdictional issue,30 but this does not apply where deciding a
substantive legal question is necessary to determine whether subject
matter jurisdiction existed.3°'
Other exceptions deal with the more technical aspects of
remand. Section 1447(d) does not bar review where the remand was
based on a party's contractual waiver of removal rights. 30 2  In
addition, appellate review is not barred on the issue of attorney fees
awarded under § 1447(c).3 °3
Despite these exceptions, the general rule remains that remand
orders based on timely raised procedural error or jurisdictional error
may not be reviewed. °4 The removal statutes serve to protect both
parties' interest in choosing a proper forum, while promoting judicial
economy. The bar on reviewing remand orders serves this purpose
in most cases by giving a defendant the chance to seek removal, and
if removal is proper, the case will likely remain in the federal courts.
If not, the plaintiff succeeds in securing her choice of forum and
need not worry about being shuffled back and forth between federal
and state courts once the remand has been ordered.
6. Life after remand
Once a federal court remands a case to state court, questions
arise as to the propriety of any rulings the district court made while
the case was still in federal court. For example, suppose while in
federal court the court dismissed a claim, and subsequently remands
the case to state court. May the plaintiff raise that claim again in
state court? Or, is the decision of the district court binding?
300. See Clorox Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 779 F.2d 517, 520 (9th Cir.
1985); Pelleport Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theaters, Inc., 741 F.2d 273
(9th Cir. 1984).
301. See Lyons v. Alaska Teamsters Employer Serv. Corp., 188 F.3d 1170,
1172 (9th Cir. 1999); Abada, 300 F.3d at 1118.
302. See Waters v. Browning Ferris Indus., 252 F.3d 796, 797 (5th Cir.
2001); In re Delta Am. Re Ins. Co., 900 F.2d 890, 892 (6th Cir. 1990).
303. See e.g., Roxbury Condo. Ass'n v. Anthony S. Cupo Agency, 316 F.3d
224, 226 (3d Cir. 2003); Moore v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 981 F.2d
443, 447 (9th Cir. 1992).
304. See supra note 294.
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In instances where the case is remanded for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, courts usually hold that any orders entered by the
district court after the case was removed to the district court must be
vacated and the entire case remanded to state court.3 °5 To hold
otherwise would be an unlawful expansion of federal jurisdiction,
giving "district courts power the congress has denied them"
3 °6
because if the district courts never had jurisdiction, they never had
the authority to issue orders in the first place.
What about when a case is remanded for a defect in removal
procedure? In these types of cases, the district court does not lack
subject matter jurisdiction, but instead remands because the case was
improperly removed-basically remand by technicality.30 7 There is
little case law on this issue, but since the court does have jurisdiction
over the case, then arguably orders granted post-removal should be
more likely to stand because there is a decreased danger of
overstepping constitutional bounds. On the other hand, since the
case has not been properly removed, the district court lacks
jurisdiction just the same and any post-removal adjudication is
305. See Brown v. Francis, 75 F.3d 860, 866-67 (3d Cir. 1996); see also
Mills v. Harmon Law Offices, 344 F.3d 42, 45-47 (1st Cir. 2003) (vacating
district court's dismissal and remanding with instructions to remand to state
court); Christopher v. Stanley-Bostitch, Inc., 240 F.3d 95, 100 (1st Cir. 2001)
("When a federal court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a
case, it is precluded from rendering any judgments on the merits of the case.");
Hernandez v. Conriv Realty Assocs., 182 F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 1999)
(vacating dismissal and remanding to district court with instructions to remand
to state court); Avitts v. Amoco Prod. Co., 53 F.3d 690, 692, 694 (5th Cir.
1995) (vacating district court's orders for preliminary injunction, costs, and
attomeys fees because the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and
remanding to district court with the instruction to remand to state court); Smith
v. Wis. Dep't of Agric., Trade and Consumer Prot., 23 F.3d 1134, 1139 n.10
(7th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he point of section 1447(c) is that a federal court does not
have the authority to dismiss a claim over which it never had jurisdiction in the
first instance. The merits of the ... claim are therefore irrelevant to this
determination."); Laughlin v. Prudential Ins. Co., 882 F.2d 187, 192 (5th Cir.
1989) (vacating "all actions taken by the district court, including the granting
of [partial] summary judgment dismissing the claims against [one defendant],"
and remanding to district court with instructions to remand for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction).
306. Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 18 (1951).
307. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2000).
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improper. This was the approach taken in Roe v. O'Donahue.
30 8
The plaintiff originally filed his claim in state court, which the
defendants then removed to a federal district court.3 0 9 The district
court dismissed one of the defendants, and then subsequently
remanded the case to state court due to a defect in removal
procedure. 310 The plaintiff appealed, and the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals vacated the district court's dismissal of one of the
defendants, stating that the "district court should not have entered
judgment for [one of the] defendants on the merits," because the
defendants failed to remove the case within thirty days.3 11 Therefore,
the court remanded the case to the district court with instructions to
remand the entire case to the state court from which it was
removed.312
In sum, if a case has been improperly removed and the plaintiff
has made a timely motion to remand, policy would seem to dictate
that the district court be precluded from adjudicating the matter.
First, the defendant was given a chance to remove, but waived this
right by failing to comply with the removal statutes. It is only fair
that the plaintiff in this case should be able to adjudicate the entire
case in her chosen forum. Second, it would be a waste of judicial
resources to have the district court contemplating claims that belong
in the state court.
H. Conclusion
As with many areas of the law, removal and remand embody the
tension of competing interests: the plaintiff's interest in choosing a
forum; the defendant's interest in removing the case to federal court;
and the federal courts' interest in promoting judicial economy and
providing relief to injured parties without overstepping
their constitutional and congressionally-created boundaries. The
respective interests of plaintiffs and defendants are especially
profound in light of the immense difference forum can make to the
308. Roe v. O'Donohue, 38 F.3d 298 (7th Cir. 1994) (abrogated on other
grounds).
309. Id. at 300.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 304.
312. Id.
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success or failure of a case.3 13 The combination of these competing
interests, new legislation, and complex removal and remand statutes
subject to various interpretations creates a legal environment that
promises only to become more interesting.
313. See Clermont & Eisenburg, supra note 2.
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